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dc.creatorSteuer, Sebastian
dc.creatorTröger, Tobias
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-31T10:43:20Z
dc.date.available2022-01-31T10:43:20Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-23
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2426
dc.description.abstractWe study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets. We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements canbe imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level. Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer "green" over "dirty" assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on "dirty" issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes. Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of "green" disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies. However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectLaw and Finance
dc.titleThe role of disclosure in green finance
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.source.filename320_SSRN-id3908617
dc.identifier.safeno320
dc.subject.keywordsgreen finance
dc.subject.keywordssustainable finance
dc.subject.keywordsesg
dc.subject.keywordsmandatory disclosure
dc.subject.keywordstaxonomies
dc.subject.keywordsbenchmarks
dc.subject.keywordslabels
dc.subject.keywordsasset pricing
dc.subject.keywordsmarket discipline
dc.subject.keywordsclimate change
dc.subject.keywordsclimate risk
dc.subject.jelD4
dc.subject.jelD6
dc.subject.jelG1
dc.subject.jelG3
dc.subject.jelG4
dc.subject.jelK2
dc.subject.topic1portfolio
dc.subject.topic1green
dc.subject.topic1development
dc.subject.topic2plausible
dc.subject.topic2quality
dc.subject.topic2jfe
dc.subject.topic3discussion
dc.subject.topic3future
dc.subject.topic3navigate
dc.subject.topic1nameSaving and Borrowing
dc.subject.topic2nameCorporate Finance
dc.subject.topic3nameCorporate Governance
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.3908617


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