Asymmetric Social Norms

dc.creator	Camera, Gabriele
dc.creator	Gioffré, Alessandro
dc.date.accessioned	2021-09-28T09:29:36Z
dc.date.available	2021-09-28T09:29:36Z
dc.date.issued	2017-01-10
dc.identifier.uri	https://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2264
dc.description.abstract	Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments.
dc.rights	Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subject	Macro Finance
dc.title	Asymmetric Social Norms
dc.type	Working Paper
dc.source.filename	162_SSRN-id2897466
dc.identifier.safeno	162
dc.subject.keywords	cooperation
dc.subject.keywords	repeated games
dc.subject.keywords	social dilemmas
dc.subject.jel	C6
dc.subject.jel	C7
dc.subject.topic1	structure
dc.subject.topic1	shareholder
dc.subject.topic1	german
dc.subject.topic2	patient
dc.subject.topic2	deviate
dc.subject.topic2	keyword
dc.subject.topic3	loewe
dc.subject.topic3	symmetric
dc.subject.topic3	homogeneous
dc.subject.topic1name	Corporate Governance
dc.subject.topic2name	Monetary Policy
dc.subject.topic3name	Investor Behaviour
dc.identifier.doi	10.2139/ssrn.2897466

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