
Asymmetric Social Norms
dc.creator | Camera, Gabriele | |
dc.creator | Gioffré, Alessandro | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-28T09:29:36Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-09-28T09:29:36Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-01-10 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2264 | |
dc.description.abstract | Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments. | |
dc.rights | Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ | |
dc.subject | Macro Finance | |
dc.title | Asymmetric Social Norms | |
dc.type | Working Paper | |
dc.source.filename | 162_SSRN-id2897466 | |
dc.identifier.safeno | 162 | |
dc.subject.keywords | cooperation | |
dc.subject.keywords | repeated games | |
dc.subject.keywords | social dilemmas | |
dc.subject.jel | C6 | |
dc.subject.jel | C7 | |
dc.subject.topic1 | structure | |
dc.subject.topic1 | shareholder | |
dc.subject.topic1 | german | |
dc.subject.topic2 | patient | |
dc.subject.topic2 | deviate | |
dc.subject.topic2 | keyword | |
dc.subject.topic3 | loewe | |
dc.subject.topic3 | symmetric | |
dc.subject.topic3 | homogeneous | |
dc.subject.topic1name | Corporate Governance | |
dc.subject.topic2name | Monetary Policy | |
dc.subject.topic3name | Investor Behaviour | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2139/ssrn.2897466 |
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LIF-SAFE Working Papers [334]