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dc.creatorTröger, Tobias H.
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-28T09:24:51Z
dc.date.available2021-09-28T09:24:51Z
dc.date.issued2015-06-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2210
dc.description.abstractThis paper looks into the specific influence that the European banking union will have on (future) bank client relationships. It shows that the intended regulatory influence on market conditions in principle serves as a powerful governance tool to achieve financial stability objectives. From this vantage, it analyzes macro-prudential instruments with a particular view to mortgage lending markets – the latter have been critical in the emergence of many modern financial crises. In gauging the impact of the new European supervisory framework, it finds that the ECB will lack influence on key macro-prudential tools to push through more rigid supervisory policies vis-à-vis forbearing national authorities. Furthermore, this paper points out that the current design of the European bail-in tool supplies resolution authorities with undue discretion. This feature which also afflicts the SRM imperils the key policy objective to re-instill market discipline on banks’ debt financing operations. The latter is also called into question because the nested regulatory technique that aims at preventing bail-outs unintendedly opens additional maneuvering space for political decision makers.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectFinancial Institutions
dc.titleRegulatory Influence on Market Conditions in the Banking Union
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.source.filename109_SSRN-id2613802
dc.identifier.safeno109
dc.subject.keywordsbanking union
dc.subject.keywordsmacro-prudential supervision
dc.subject.keywordsreal estate lending
dc.subject.keywordsbail-in
dc.subject.keywordsmarket discipline
dc.subject.jelE44
dc.subject.jelG01
dc.subject.jelG18
dc.subject.jelG21
dc.subject.jelG28
dc.subject.jelK22
dc.subject.jelK23
dc.subject.topic1constant
dc.subject.topic1buffer
dc.subject.topic1multiplex
dc.subject.topic2loan
dc.subject.topic2implicit
dc.subject.topic2stability
dc.subject.topic3system
dc.subject.topic3legal
dc.subject.topic3instrument
dc.subject.topic1nameSystematic Risk
dc.subject.topic2nameStability and Regulation
dc.subject.topic3nameCorporate Governance
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.2613802


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