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dc.creatorBursian, Dirk
dc.creatorWeichenrieder, Alfons J.
dc.creatorZimmer, Jochen
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-28T09:17:14Z
dc.date.available2021-09-28T09:17:14Z
dc.date.issued2013-06-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2123
dc.description.abstractThe paper looks at the determinants of fiscal adjustments as reflected in the primary surplus of countries. Our conjecture is that governments will usually find it more attractive to pursue fiscal adjustments in a situation of relatively high growth, but based on a simple stylized model of government behavior the expectation is that mainly high trust governments will be in a position to defer consolidation to years with higher growth. Overall, our analysis of a panel of European countries provides support for this expectation. The difference in fiscal policies depending on government trust levels may help explaining why better governed countries have been found to have less severe business cycles. It suggests that trust and credibility play an important role not only in monetary policy, but also in fiscal policy.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectMacro Finance
dc.subjectSystemic Risk Lab
dc.titleTrust in Government and Fiscal Adjustments
dc.typeWorking Paper
dcterms.referenceshttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/1401?Eurobarometer
dc.source.filename22_SSRN-id2280367
dc.identifier.safeno22
dc.subject.keywordstrust
dc.subject.keywordsdebt sustainability
dc.subject.keywordsfiscal reaction function
dc.subject.keywordseuro area
dc.subject.keywordseu
dc.subject.jelH62
dc.subject.jelE62
dc.subject.topic1efficiency
dc.subject.topic1kydland
dc.subject.topic1barro
dc.subject.topic2weigh
dc.subject.topic2endogenous
dc.subject.topic2connection
dc.subject.topic3contrast
dc.subject.topic3note
dc.subject.topic3trust
dc.subject.topic1nameCorporate Governance
dc.subject.topic2nameSystematic Risk
dc.subject.topic3nameFiscal Stability
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.2280367


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Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International