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dc.creatorEufinger, Christian
dc.creatorGill, Andrej
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-28T09:16:05Z
dc.date.available2021-09-28T09:16:05Z
dc.date.issued2018-05-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://fif.hebis.de/xmlui/handle/123456789/2110
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on executive incentive schemes. We argue that excessive risk-taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea behind the proposed regulatory approach is thus that the more the compensation structure decouples the interests of bank managers from those of shareholders by curbing risk-taking incentives, the higher the leverage the bank is permitted to take on. Consequently, the risk-shifting incentives caused by government guarantees and the risk-mitigating incentives created by the compensation structure offset each other such that the manager chooses the socially efficient investment policy.
dc.rightsAttribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectTransparency Lab
dc.subjectCorporate Finance
dc.titleIncentive-Based Capital Requirements
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.source.filename9_SSRN-id1967492
dc.identifier.safeno9
dc.subject.keywordsbasel iii
dc.subject.keywordscapital regulation
dc.subject.keywordscompensation
dc.subject.keywordsleverage
dc.subject.keywordsrisk
dc.subject.jelG21
dc.subject.jelG28
dc.subject.jelG30
dc.subject.jelG32
dc.subject.jelG38
dc.subject.topic1measure
dc.subject.topic1profit
dc.subject.topic1point
dc.subject.topic2exAnte
dc.subject.topic2proof
dc.subject.topic2traditional
dc.subject.topic3shareholder
dc.subject.topic3author
dc.subject.topic3principle
dc.subject.topic1nameMonetary Policy
dc.subject.topic2nameStability and Regulation
dc.subject.topic3nameCorporate Governance
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.1967492


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