• A Repeated Principal-Agent Model with On-the-Job Search 

      Herbold, Daniel (2014-08-01)
      This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives ...
    • Bank Networks: Contagion, Systemic Risk and Prudential Policy 

      Aldasoro, Iñaki; Delli Gatti, Domenico; Faia, Ester (2015-07-01)
      We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Market clearing takes place through a tâtonnement process which yields the ...
    • The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence 

      Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian (2016-07-15)
      We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making ...
    • The Impact of Job Referrals on Employment Outcomes in Top Corporate Positions 

      Levati, Lorenzo Maria; Lalanne, Marie (2020-03-01)
      Using an original dataset on professional networks of directors sitting on the boards of large US corporations, we examine how personal relationships are used by firms to improve job match quality in the high-skill segment ...
    • The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections 

      Faia, Ester; Mayer, Maximilian; Pezone, Vincenzo (2020-04-13)
      This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of ...
    • The Value of Firm Networks: A Natural Experiment on Board Connections 

      Faia, Ester; Mayer, Maximilian; Pezone, Vincenzo (2021-08-03)
      We present causal evidence on the effect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and ...