• A Repeated Principal-Agent Model with On-the-Job Search 

      Herbold, Daniel (2014-08-01)
      This paper analyzes how on-the-job search (OJS) by an agent impacts the moral hazard problem in a repeated principal-agent relationship. OJS is found to constitute a source of agency costs because efficient search incentives ...
    • Motivated Beliefs and the Elderly's Compliance with COVID-19 Measures 

      von Siemens, Ferdinand (2021-01-26)
      Although the elderly are more vulnerable to COVID-19, the empirical evidence suggests that they do not behave more cautiously in the pandemic than younger individuals. This theoretical model argues that some individuals ...
    • Signaling Cooperation 

      Heinz, Matthias; Schumacher, Heiner (2015-11-08)
      We examine what an applicant’s vita signals to potential employers about her willingness to cooperate in teams. Intensive social engagement may credibly reveal that an applicant cares about the well-being of others and ...
    • The Forward-looking Disclosures of Corporate Managers: Theory and Evidence 

      Gropp, Reint E.; Karapandza, Rasa; Opferkuch, Julian (2016-07-15)
      We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making ...