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United in Diversity? The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union

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The Relationship between Monetary Policy and Prudential Supervision in the Banking Union

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and prudential supervision in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might corroborate each other, or get into conflict. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes considerations of financial stability into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to price stability.

The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may still pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and prudential supervision, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy and supervisory mandates of the ECB, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or price stability). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy.

As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor's legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law's indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation.

This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving its transparency, responsiveness, and representativeness without removing its technocratic character.

Keywords

Banking Union, Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Democratic Legitimacy

A. “Two Souls Alas! Are Dwelling in My Breast”

Since November 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) has enjoyed a tremendous increase in its powers: The Unified Banking Supervisory Mechanism – known as the Single Supervisory Mechanism, or SSM – began operating under the auspices of the ECB.¹ It has since been endowed with the task of supervising currently 119 banks in the Eurozone identified as significant.² The SSM was established to break the diabolic loop between banking crises, bank bailouts, and ensuing sovereign debt crises. The 2012 Spanish and Cypriot banking crises required the respective governments to bail out troubled banks, raising sovereign debt to unsustainable levels. This prompted the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to grant financial assistance to both governments for the recapitalization of their financial sectors in accordance with Article 15 of the ESM Treaty to minimize the consequences of the financial turmoil for the real economy. With the ESM having to shoulder the financial consequences of banking crises resulting, amongst other, from flaws in the supervision of financial institutions by the member states, calls emerged for the europeanization of the supervision of systemically important banks, including alongside the SSM a Single Resolution Mechanism and a common deposit guarantee fund.³ In that way, supervisory responsibility would be aligned with the financial burden of providing a fiscal back-stop to failing banks.⁴

The ECB was entrusted with hosting the SSM, not only because it appeared as the most competent institution to discharge of that task,⁵ but also because Art. 127(6) TFEU offered a seemingly convenient legal basis for conferring the task to the ECB.⁶ However, charging the ECB with supervision gives rise to potential

¹ Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63–89 (hereinafter “SSM Regulation”).

² Comprehensively on the establishment of the Banking Union: N. Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing Its Risks and Resilience”, 51 *Common Market Law Review* (2014) 1609-1670, 1616. The list of entities classified as significant and currently supervised by the SSM is available on the SSM website: <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/banking/list/who/html/index.en.html>.

³ Van Rompuy et al., ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, 26 June 2012, EUCO 120/12, 4-5. On the Spanish and Cypriot Banking Crises see T. H. Tröger, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism — Panacea or Quack Banking Regulation?”, 15 *European Business Organization Law Review* (2014) 449-497, 456 et seq.

⁴ On this principle see already T. Padoa-Schioppa, “EMU and Banking Supervision”, 2 *International Finance* (1999) 295-308.

⁵ See recital 13, Regulation 1024/2013; .

⁶ Moloney (n 2) 1659; E. Wymeersch, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Institutional Aspects”, in D. Busch and G. Ferrarini (ed.), *European Banking Union* (2015) 93. Whether the SSM respects the limits of Art. 127(6) TFEU is disputed. In favor, emphasizing the fact that the SSM relies on the cooperation of national authorities with the ECB and that the latter retain specific tasks: M. Selmayr, “Artikel 127”, in H. von der Groeben et al. (ed.), *Europäisches Unionsrecht* 3 (2015) marginal nos 53-55; C. Ohler, *Bankenaufsicht und Geldpolitik in der Währungsunion* (2015) 145-6; J. A. Kämmerer, “Bahn frei der Bankenunion? Die neuen Aufsichtsbefugnisse der EZB im Lichte der EU-Kompetenzordnung”, *Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht* (2013) 830-836, 832-4; sceptical: C. Waldhoff and P. Dieterich, “Einführung einer gemeinsamen Bankenaufsicht auf EU-Ebene - ein Überblick über die Rechtsprobleme”, *Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht* (2013) 72, 75; M. Lehmann and C. Manger-Nestler, “Einheitlicher Europäischer Aufsichtsmechanismus: Bankenaufsicht durch die EZB”, *Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft* (2014) 2-21, 6-7; A.-K. Kaufhold, “Die Europäische Bankenunion - vollendet unvollendet? Eine Zwischenbilanz”, 32

conflicts of interest between the monetary policy and supervisory functions of the ECB, as there is a high level of interdependence between monetary policy and the stability of the financial system (B.I.).

According to one view, it is preferable to assign monetary policy and prudential supervision to separate institutions as such conflicts of interest would only endanger price stability or financial stability (B.II.). In the context of the SSM, Germany successfully insisted on that position.⁷ As a result, Art. 25(2) SSM Regulation provides for the meticulous separation of the monetary policy and supervisory functions of the ECB.⁸ Prudential supervision was entrusted to a separate Supervisory Board within the ECB. While the Supervisory Board cannot take binding decisions itself as primary law requires the Governing Council to take any decisions on behalf of the ECB,⁹ the Governing Council may only accept or reject, but not modify the decisions proposed by the Supervisory Board, nor act otherwise upon its own initiative in matters of prudential supervision.¹⁰

However, others argue that the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability requires a more holistic approach to ensure that monetary policy and prudential supervision mutually reinforce, rather than defeat, each other (B.III.). The argument is not merely theoretical. On the one hand, during the Great Financial Crisis beginning in 2008, addressing systemic risks required close coordination between monetary and supervisory actions. On the other hand, the aftermath of the crisis has revealed that even in ordinary times, the coordination of monetary policy and prudential supervision might reap some benefits and prevent some harms. For some years now, various stakeholders have articulated their concerns about the stability of the European banking system due to the permissive monetary policy stance taken by the ECB. For example, they believe that the need of many European banks to clean their balance sheets from risky assets in order to meet new capital requirements prevented the expansionary monetary policy of the ECB from taking full effect.¹¹ Also, market participants have repeatedly voiced concern over the effects of the ECB policy rate at the zero lower bound on financial stability, as it reduces bank's profitability.¹² Conversely, the ECB's

Zeitschrift für Gesetzgebung (2017) 18-37, 33. Instructive on the legislative history: R. Smits, *The European Central Bank. Institutional Aspects* (1997) 356.

⁷ K. Alexander, "European Banking Union: A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism", 40 *European Law Review* (2015) 154-187, 165; J. A. Kämmerer, "Bahn frei der Bankenunion? Die neuen Aufsichtsbefugnisse der EZB im Lichte der EU-Kompetenzordnung", *Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht* (2013) 830-836 (n 6), 832.

⁸ See also the Decision of the European Central Bank on the implementation of separation between the monetary policy and supervision functions of the European Central Bank of 17 September 2004, ECB/2014/39.

⁹ Art. 129 and 282 (2), TFEU, in conjunction with Art. 12.1, ESCB Statute.

¹⁰ Art. 26 (8), SSM Regulation.

¹¹ S. Micossi, "The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank (2002 to 2015)", *LUISS Guido Carli School of European Political Economy Working Paper* (2015) No. 2015/4, 28.

¹² E.g. Christian Siedenbiel, 'Banken und EZB geben sich gegenseitig Schuld an der Misere', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 October 2016, <<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/finanzen/anleihen-zinsen/deutsche-banken-kritisieren-geldpolitik-der-ezb-14466320.html>>.

Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO), monetary policy transactions offering instruments with higher interest rates and maturities of up to four years, have contributed to financial stability by providing some relief for financial institutions with otherwise low profits.¹³ A more holistic approach to monetary policy and prudential supervision therefore seems apposite.

This paper takes issue with the alleged strict separation between monetary policy and prudential supervision in the legal framework of the SSM. It argues that, whatever the economic merits of a more holistic approach, should the ECB opt for it, neither the SSM Regulation nor the European Treaties seem to provide insurmountable legal hurdles. In fact, a purposive reading of the Treaties reveals that the ECB's monetary policy may take into account considerations relating to financial stability (C.I.). The same applies *mutatis mutandis* to supervisory decisions under the SSM Regulation, which should pay heed to monetary policy transmission (C.II.). Consequently, it seems that the SSM Regulation repeats past mistakes in the design of the Economic and Monetary Union by creating the expectation that the law corroborates a clear commitment to a certain economic policy (here, the meticulous separation between monetary policy and prudential supervision). However, the legal provisions meant to guarantee that commitment would hardly stand the test of practice under constantly changing, rather unpredictable economic and financial conditions. The paper suggests a legal instability theorem, which explains this observation (C.III.).

This finding has repercussions for constitutional theory as it casts serious doubt on the technocratic legitimacy of the ESCB. It corroborates claims to step up the democratic legitimacy of the latter (D.). Ultimately, a deliberative understanding of the law, which considers the law as a guideline for procedures and argumentative processes, might be more successful for the governance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (E.).

B. Economics: From Functional Separation to Holistic Approaches?

I. The Interplay between Monetary Policy and Financial Stability – Accept or Ignore?

Today, hardly anyone would doubt that monetary policy and the stability of financial institutions are highly interrelated. In fact, inflation-targeting monetary policy and stability-oriented prudential supervision might

¹³ M. Hellwig, "Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking", *Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods* (2014), 3-4. On LTRO, see ECB, 'ECB announces measures to support bank lending and money market activity', Press release, 8 December 2011, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html>. See also the Decision of the European Central Bank of 29 July 2014 on measures relating to targeted longer-term refinancing operations, ECB/2014/34, OJ L 258/11 of 29 August 2014 and subsequent modifications.

have a positive or negative influence on another.¹⁴ Various channels for the transmission of monetary policy affect financial stability. One of them is the bank lending channel. Accordingly, monetary policy determines the supply of money to banks and their refinancing conditions, thereby setting the frame for the supply of credit.¹⁵ The amount of credit has an impact upon financial stability. Another channel is the balance sheet channel. Accordingly, rising interest rates lead to decreasing bond prices as companies face higher costs of capital and as investors find it more attractive to leave their money in their bank deposits instead of investing them in the real economy.¹⁶ This constrains the capacity of bank customers to borrow as the value of the assets they can pledge as collateral for their loans decreases.¹⁷ Lower bank performance resulting from lower demand for credit as well as the declining value of assets pledged as collateral give rise to stability concerns. A third channel is the risk taking channel. Accordingly, lower interest rates provide an incentive for banks to make riskier investments.¹⁸

Conversely, prudential supervision has an impact on the transmission of monetary policy as it affects the capacity of banks to create money through lending. This concerns both microprudential and macroprudential regulation. Microprudential tools such as ordinary capital requirements determine the volume of the loans a bank can make.¹⁹ Macroprudential tools, such as countercyclical capital buffers,²⁰ might force banks to curb their lending to prevent financial instability, but at the same time, it decreases the quantity of money.²¹

The interplay between monetary policy and financial stability prompts the question for the right institutional arrangement. Specifically, monetary policy and prudential supervision might be entrusted to one single

¹⁴ B. S. Bernake, "The Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice", *Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 56th Economic Conference, Boston, Massachusetts* (8 October 2011), 12; F. De Graeve, T. Kick and M. Koetter, "Monetary policy and financial (in) stability: An integrated micro–macro approach", 4 *Journal of Financial Stability* (2008) 205-231; I. Agur and M. Demertzis, "Will Macroprudential Policy Counteract Monetary Policy's Effects on Financial Stability?", *IMF Working Paper WP/15/283 (2015)* (2015); K. Alexander, "The ECB and Banking Supervision: Building Effective Prudential Supervision?", 33 *Yearbook of European Law* (2014) 417-432, 423.

¹⁵ B. S. Bernanke and M. Gertler, "Inside the black box: the credit channel of monetary policy transmission", *National bureau of economic research Working Paper No. w5146 (1995)* (1995); S. Glatz, *Geldpolitik und Bankenaufsicht im Konflikt. Die Pflicht der Mitgliedstaaten zur Unterstützung der EZB im Bereich der Preisstabilität unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bankenaufsicht* (2009) 192-212.

¹⁶ 'Why do interest rates tend to have an inverse relationship with bond prices?', Investopedia <<http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/031904.asp>>.

¹⁷ A. K. Kashyap and J. C. Stein, "The impact of monetary policy on bank balance sheets", 42 *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* (1995) 151-195.

¹⁸ C. Borio and H. Zhu, "Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?", 8 *Journal of Financial Stability* (2012) 236-251.

¹⁹ S. J. Van den Heuvel, "Does bank capital matter for monetary transmission?", 8 *Economic Policy Review* (2002) 259-265.

²⁰ Art. 130, Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ L 176/338 of 27 June 2013 ("CRD IV").

²¹ I. Angeloni and E. Faia, "Capital regulation and monetary policy with fragile banks", 60 *Journal of Monetary Economics* (2013) 311-324.

institution under an integration model, in which the central bank exercises supervisory functions, or to two different institutions (or two different parts of the same institution) under a separation model, in which supervision is assigned to a separate authority. Further, a separation model might provide that the different institutions (or different parts of the same institution) carry out their functions in a cooperative relationship, or in splendid isolation from each other.²² As the research about the relationship between monetary policy and prudential supervision and the advantages or disadvantages of the different models is an evolving area of research, the question for the right institutional arrangement has found different answers at different times.

II. The Rise of the Separation Model

At the time of the introduction of financial supervision alongside central banking – a process that spanned in most jurisdictions from the 19th century to the aftermath of the Great Depression or even beyond²³ – the interplay between monetary policy and financial supervision had little impact on institutional choices. Rather, the choice between an integration model and a separation model often reflected different traditions in dealing with banking crises. The integration model derives from the function of central banks as “lenders of last resort”.²⁴ According to Bagehot, lending of last resort should only be granted to banks with a lack of liquidity, not with solvency problems.²⁵ Once the central bank took over the risk of lending of last resort from informal bankers’ clubs, it required detailed information about the financial situation of commercial banks to be in a position to assess their solvency in case of a crisis. This model prevailed i.a. in Great Britain between 1979 and 2000.²⁶ By contrast, jurisdictions where banks tend to get bailouts from the treasury rather than having the central bank act as a lender of last resort, tended to opt for a separation model and assigned

²² Cf. C. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker, "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?", 47 *Oxford Economic Papers* (1995) 539-560; L. Amorello, *The Legal Interaction between Macropprudential Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy in the European Union* (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author, 2017).

²³ For the US: A. Komai and G. Richardson, "A brief history of regulations regarding financial markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009", *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w17443 (2011)* (2011); for England: F. Capie, *The Bank of England* (2010); for Germany: C. Müller, *Die Entstehung des Reichsgesetzes über das Kreditwesen vom 5. Dezember 1934* (2003); for France: A. Plessis, "The history of banks in France", in M. Pohl (ed.), *Handbook on the History of European Banks* (1994) 185-296.

²⁴ Goodhart & Schoenmaker (n 22), 541.

²⁵ W. Bagehot, *Lombard Street. A Description of the Money Market* (1873) 48 et seq.

²⁶ Goodhart & Schoenmaker (n 22), 539; M. Buckle and J. L. Thompson, *The UK financial system: Theory and practice* (4 edn., 2004) 334 et seq.; A. Thiele, *Finanzaufsicht* (2014) 193 et seq.

financial supervision to one or multiple separate authorities within the hierarchy of government.²⁷ Germany is an example for this model.²⁸

In the decades after the Second World War, there was no compelling case for the separation model, either. In fact, little significance was attributed to the impact of capital adequacy on monetary policy.²⁹ Instead, in line with Keynesian equilibrium theory, monetary policy primarily focused on the real economy. The Philips curve seemed to suggest that monetary policy was a legitimate instrument to control unemployment.³⁰ Expansive monetary policy thus prevailed in many countries even in the inflationary climate of the late 1960s and 1970s in order to spur growth.³¹ Further, the scarcity of banking crises in industrial states between the Great Depression and the 1970s may have contributed to this shift in the focus of monetary policy away from issues of financial stability and towards macroeconomics.³² But the neglect of financial stability by monetary policy was rather coincidental and not necessarily an essential aspect of economic theory.

The separation model gained ground only in the following decades because of changing views about monetary policy. Monetarism had argued as early as 1960 that permissive monetary policy would stimulate growth only in the short term and would be macroeconomically neutral in the longer term, leading merely to a higher price level. To address this time inconsistency problem, monetarists like Milton Friedman advocated a commitment to price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy.³³ When central banks managed to control stagflation through rules-based inflation targeting in the 1980s, many took it as a vindication of monetarism, and the focus of the monetary policy of many central banks shifted towards price stability.³⁴ This led to calls for central bank independence in order to isolate the central bank from political influence that would distract from its inflation target.³⁵ Nevertheless, the new ideal of rules-based monetary

²⁷ Goodhart and Schoenmaker (n 22) 543-4.

²⁸ Thiele (n 26).194-5; on the origins of the German model, which can also be traced back to the desire of the Nazi regime to control financial supervision, see C. Müller, *Die Entstehung des Reichsgesetzes über das Kreditwesen vom 5. Dezember 1934* (2003) (n 23) 382-5.

²⁹ S. J. Van den Heuvel, "Does bank capital matter for monetary transmission?", 8 *Economic Policy Review* (2002) 259-265, 259.

³⁰ This understanding of the Philips curve was proposed by P. A. Samuelson and R. M. Solow, "Analytical aspects of anti-inflation policy", 50 *The American Economic Review* (1960) 177-194.

³¹ For the US: J. B. Taylor, "A historical analysis of monetary policy rules", in J. B. Taylor (ed.), *Monetary policy rules* (1999) 319-348, 338-339.

³² Hellwig (n 13), 18.

³³ M. Friedman, *A Program for Monetary Stability* (1960); M. Friedman, "The Role of Monetary Policy", 58 *The American Economic Review* (1968) 1-17.

³⁴ V. P. Ioannidou, "Does monetary policy affect the central bank's role in bank supervision?", 14 *Journal of Financial Intermediation* (2005) 58-85, 59; R. Franck and M. Krausz, "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?", 36 *Journal of Comparative Economics* (2008) 388-411, 389; R. M. Lastra, "Central Bank Independence and Financial Stability", 18 *Revista de Estabilidad Financiera* (2010) 51-66; H. James, *Making the European Monetary Union* (2012) 180 et seq.

³⁵ K. Rogoff, "The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target", 100 *The quarterly journal of economics* (1985) 1169-1189; C. E. Walsh, "Optimal contracts for central bankers", *The American Economic Review*

policy by independent central banks had another ramification that led to the rise of the separation model. Jan Tinbergen's theory of economic decentralization emphasized that the pursuit of different, potentially conflicting policy goals by government under the conditions of uncertainty required assigning different objectives to different actors equipped with the appropriate instruments to reach that objective.³⁶ Hence, the central bank's policy rate was considered as the perfect instrument for inflation targeting in accordance with the now prevailing neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis, but not for preventing asset bubbles and the related risks to financial stability.³⁷ These functions should therefore better be assigned to different authorities.³⁸ Separating monetary policy from prudential supervision would thus protect monetary policy against potentially problematic distractions from inflation targeting. Another popular view was that the effects of price stability on financial stability would only be positive, and that the best possible contribution of a central bank to financial stability would be to target inflation.³⁹ This reveals that the separation model corresponded to the epistemology behind (neo)liberalism, which doubts the capacity of the state to perform the incredibly complex task of steering the economy comprehensively and prefers to leave as many decisions as possible to the market.⁴⁰ Accordingly, singling out different policy objectives and mandating different actors to pursue one of them each under a policy rule has the benefit of reducing complexity.⁴¹

Subsequently, the separation model gained traction around the world since about the 1970s, and massively so during the 1990s.⁴² This occurred despite the fact that the interplay between monetary policy and prudential supervision began to be recognized during that period.⁴³ Apart from the historical success of independent, rule-observing central banks in curbing inflation, the rise of the separation model may have

(1995) 150-167; Hellwig (n 13), 12-3. Somewhat surprisingly, Milton Friedman rejected central bank independence. See M. Friedman, "Should there be an independent monetary authority?", in L. Yeager (ed.), *In search of a monetary constitution* (1962) 219-43; M. Friedman, *Capitalism and freedom* (1962) 77. However, the conundrum quickly dissolves when considering that Friedman understood independence as synonymous with discretion, hence in opposition to his proposal of a rules-based, inflation-targeting monetary policy. Central bank independence is in line with Friedman's views to the extent that it relates to the instruments of monetary policy only, not to the goals. See S. Fischer, "Central-Bank Independence Revisited", 85 *The American Economic Review* (1995) 201-206; 202.

³⁶ J. Tinbergen, *Centralization and decentralization in economic policy* (1954) 75. On the significance of Tinbergen's work, see F. Bruni and D. Masciandaro, "Evaluating Central Bank Independence. Theoretical Issues and European Perspectives", 99 *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali* (1991) 93-117, 101-3; O. Issing, "Monetary and financial stability: is there a trade-off?", 18 *BIS Papers* (2003) 16-23, 19.

³⁷ A. Greenspan, "Economic Volatility", *Proceedings of Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium, Jackson Hole*. (2002).

³⁸ Cf. P. Docherty, "Basel II and the Political Economy of Banking Regulation-Monetary Policy Interaction", 37 *International Journal of Political Economy* (2008) 82-106, 92-3.

³⁹ A. J. Schwartz, "Why Financial Stability Depends on Price Stability", 15 *Economic Affairs* (1995) 21-25.

⁴⁰ Cf. F. v. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty 1: Rules and Order* (1974) 8-31.

⁴¹ Seminal for the rules vs. discretion debate: F. E. Kydland and E. C. Prescott, "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", 85 *The Journal of Political Economy* (1977) 473-492.

⁴² S. Polillo and M. F. Guillén, "Globalization Pressures and the State: The Worldwide Spread of Central Bank Independence", 110 *American Journal of Sociology* (2005) 1764-1802, 1770-1.

⁴³ E.g. Bernake and Gertler (n 15).

been facilitated by the fact that central banks temporarily lost significance as lenders of last resort with the establishment of deposit guarantee schemes and the expansion of the financial sector, including the development of a highly liquid interbank market.⁴⁴

Certainly, not all Member States of the Eurozone follow the separation model. Although the independence of central banks has constitutional status,⁴⁵ no similar dogma exists with respect to the separation of monetary policy from supervisory functions.⁴⁶ Also, some jurisdictions mix elements of both models, such as the United States. While the Federal Reserve does have important supervisory powers, they do not extend over all financial institutions.⁴⁷ And there is no consensus as to whether it is preferable to have just one or several supervisory authorities.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the trend towards a separation model has been clear prior to the Great Financial Crisis.

III. After the Crisis: Towards a More Holistic Approach?

The experience of the Great Financial Crisis called the separation model into question. An overly strict separation might jeopardize the effective management of systemic crises. Even during normal times, it might generate risks for both financial stability and price stability. This has prompted calls for a holistic approach that unites the diverging policy objectives and reopens questions of institutional design.

As concerns systemic risk, the financial crisis provided a dramatic illustration of the disadvantages of a strictly enforced separation model in case of a systemic event. In such a situation, conducting monetary policy regardless of issues of financial stability could put the banking sector at risk. Likewise, supervisory measures that do not take due account of their implications for monetary policy could jeopardize the central bank's much needed liquidity injections.⁴⁹ Ben Bernake, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve at the time, went as far as to assing to systemic stability the same significance as to price stability with regard to the mandate of the Federal Reserve.⁵⁰ The De Larosière report, which laid the foundation for macroprudential supervision in Europe, admonished that monetary policy should take credit

⁴⁴ Goodhart & Schoenmaker (n 22) 544-5.

⁴⁵ Art. 130, 282 (3), TFEU.

⁴⁶ R. M. Lastra, *Legal foundations of international monetary stability* (2006) 90.

⁴⁷ See chart in Federal Reserve System, *The Federal Reserve System. Purposes & Function* (10th edn., 2016) 77.

⁴⁸ Lastra (n 46) 96.

⁴⁹ Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, "Rethinking Central Banking", *Brookings Institution (2011)* (2011); M. Hellwig, "Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking", *Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods* (2014) (n 13) 21; T. Beck and D. Gros, "Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision: Coordination Instead of Separation", *CEPS Policy Brief No. 286* (2012) (2012).

⁵⁰ Bernake (n 14) 5.

growth into consideration as the availability of excess liquidity during a period of low inflation had led to the buildup of risk in the banking sector.⁵¹ With its LTRO window, the ECB adopted a monetary policy instrument that had the explicit purpose of improving financial stability, and thus, monetary policy transmission, by offering attractive conditions to commercial banks in a period characterized by low performance and little trust.⁵² In that respect, LTRO shows as close an interdependence between monetary policy and financial stability as the ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions programme showed it for the relation between monetary and fiscal policy.⁵³ Conversely, newly introduced macroprudential instruments such as counter-cyclical capital buffers might prevent systemic risk as much as they would corroborate a tightening of monetary policy (or undermine a more permissive monetary policy stance).⁵⁴ In respect of systemic risk and systemic events, a more holistic approach to monetary policy and prudential supervision therefore seems apposite.

But the crisis also gives reason to explore the potential of closer coordination between monetary policy and prudential supervision during normal times, outside periods of systemic risk. The crisis has refreshed awareness of the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability described above.⁵⁵ The credit crunch has demonstrated that the transmission of the monetary policy impulses of the central bank to the financial markets and the ability of these impulses to increase or reduce the quantity of money depends on the smooth intermediation of the financial sector.⁵⁶ Higher capital requirements might strangulate output if monetary policy cannot lower interest rates any further.⁵⁷ Conversely, the current phase of extremely low interest rates might compromise financial stability, as it incentivizes higher risk-taking by banks.⁵⁸ To make matters worse, the separation model rests on certain assumptions that have lost credibility as a consequence of the Great Financial Crisis. Financial intermediation does not work as smoothly as the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis suggests – a cornerstone of any decentralized institutional model that relies on market

⁵¹ J. De Larosière et al., "Report of the high-level group on financial supervision in the EU", *European Commission. Brussels (2009)* (2009) para. 48. The ECB had recognized the need for central banks to promote systemic stability even before the crisis: L. Bini Smaghi, "Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice", 14 *European Law Journal* (2008) 446-460, 454.

⁵² See *supra* (n 13) and accompanying text.

⁵³ See only ECJ, Case C-62/14 *Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bundestag*, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, judgment of 16 June 2015, paras 51 and 52.

⁵⁴ Cf. *supra* (n 20).

⁵⁵ *Supra*, B.I.

⁵⁶ Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, "Rethinking Central Banking", *Brookings Institution (2011)* (2011) (n 49) 5 et seq.; O. Blanchard, G. Dell'Ariccia and P. Mauro, "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy", *IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/03* (2010) 5.

⁵⁷ S. Roger and J. Vlček, "Macroeconomic Costs of Higher Bank Capital and Liquidity Requirements", *IMF Working Paper* (2011).

⁵⁸ This is called the risk-taking channel, cf. G. Dell'Ariccia, L. Laeven and R. Marquez, "Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk-Taking", *IMF Working Paper No. 276* (2010).

forces rather than on institutional oversight.⁵⁹ Rather, in line with Hyman Minsky's prediction, they tend to build up risk that materializes in fairly regular crisis events.⁶⁰ Further, financial liberalization has increased the possibility of the market to extend credit. There is evidence that this has reduced the influence of the central bank policy rate on effective long-term interest rates. Financial markets have gradually de-coupled themselves from the generation of the base money by the central bank.⁶¹

This prompts the question whether the dominance of the separation model and the underlying doctrine that monetary policy should remain unaffected by financial stability concerns is still justified. It is unclear in the present situation which goal would be served if monetary policy and prudential supervision pull on the opposing ends of the same string. Important voices in the economic literature therefore favor a more holistic approach, where monetary policy decisions pay due regard to financial stability concerns, and where supervisory decisions account for monetary policy effects.⁶² Empirical evidence about the merits of such an approach the separation model is still fraught with uncertainties, though.⁶³

The holistic approach would not necessarily require rebuilding the institutional setup and unifying supervision and monetary policy in one institution. It would suffice to ensure consistency between monetary policy and financial supervision to render both effective.⁶⁴ Hence, the holistic approach mostly concerns the way in which institutions exercise their respective mandates.⁶⁵ It could even be implemented under a separation model if the central bank and the supervisory authority coordinate their decisions. Not surprisingly, proponents of this view mostly have a certain affinity for Keynesian approaches to macroeconomics, which encourage holistic thinking. The opposite view maintains that monetary policy is

⁵⁹ Cf. E. F. Fama, "Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work", 25 *The Journal of Finance* (1970) 383-417.

⁶⁰ Cf. H. P. Minsky, "The Financial Instability Hypothesis", *Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 74* (1992). On the rediscovery of Minsky after the crisis, see J. B. Rosser, M. V. Rosser and M. Gallegati, "A Minsky-Kindleberger perspective on the financial crisis", 46 *Journal of Economic Issues* (2012) 449-458.

⁶¹ Based on econometric data: H. Cömert, *Central banks and financial markets: the declining power of US monetary policy* (2013) 89 et seq.

⁶² Goodhart & Schoenmaker (n 22) 547-8; Issing (n 36), 18; Blanchard et al. (n 56) 11-13; Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform (n 56); Hellwig (n 13) 18-19. Overview of the most pertinent arguments pro and contra holistic approaches: E. W. Nier, "Financial stability frameworks and the role of central banks: lessons from the crisis", *IMF Working Paper WP/09/70* (2009) (2009) 14 et seq.

⁶³ R. Goyal et al., "A banking union for the euro area", *IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/13/01* (2013) (2013) 14; skeptical about the merits of the separation model: W. Berger and F. Kißmer, "Central bank independence and financial stability: A tale of perfect harmony?", 31 *European Journal of Political Economy* (2013) 109-118. Evidence from before the crisis: De Graeve et al. (n 14); Ioannidou (n 34); emphasizing the need for further research: G. Carboni, M. Darracq Pariès and C. Kok, "Exploring the Nexus between Macro-Prudential Policies and Monetary Policy Measures", *ECB Financial Stability Review* (May 2013) 99; finding evidence for the positive effects of a coordination between macroprudential supervision and monetary policy: V. Bruno, I. Shim and H. S. Shin, "Comparative assessment of macroprudential policies", 28 *Journal of Financial Stability* (2017) 183-202.

⁶⁴ R. M. Lastra, *International financial and monetary law* (2nd edn., 2015) 125.

⁶⁵ D. Green, "The Relationship between Micro-Macro-Prudential Supervision and Central Banking", in E. Wymeersch et al. (ed.), *Financial Regulation and Supervision* (2012) 57-68 63 (3.32).

simply too blunt for supervisory considerations and that the functions should therefore better remain separated.⁶⁶

The call for more holistic approaches has not remained without practical consequences. The most obvious one is the establishment of bodies for macroprudential, or systemic, supervision in most developed jurisdictions, which regularly include central banks alongside supervisory authorities.⁶⁷ As concerns microprudential supervision, the UK Financial Services Authority was dissolved and supervisory powers were transferred to the Prudential Regulation Authority, which forms an integral part of the Bank of England. Even Germany, the strongest advocate of the separation model at the European level, discussed conferring supervisory powers to the Bundesbank in the crisis aftermath.⁶⁸

Concerning monetary policy, it seems that the ECB has made its choice already in 2003 when it officially adopted a two-pillar strategy to monetary policy.⁶⁹ It consists on the one hand of an economic analysis of risks to price stability in the short to medium term, and on the other hand of a monetary analysis focusing on monetary growth in the medium to long term.⁷⁰ The ECB uses the longer perspective of its monetary analysis to cross-check the results of its economic analysis.⁷¹ As part of the monetary analysis, the ECB observes asset price developments, as the collapse of asset price bubbles might lead to deflation in the long term. The ECB does not attempt to burst asset price bubbles, but pursues a strategy of “leaning against the wind” to prevent unhealthy developments while staying focused on price stability.⁷²

This move towards holistic approaches raises the question whether it would be in conformity with the legal framework of the EMU.

⁶⁶ G. Claeys and Z. M. Darvas, "The financial stability risks of ultra-loose monetary policy", *Bruegel Policy Contribution No. 2015/03 (2015)* (2015), 12; S. Laseen, A. Pescatori and J. Turunen, "Systemic Risk: A New Trade-off for Monetary Policy?", *IMF Working Paper WP/15/142 (2015)* (2015).

⁶⁷ A.-K. Kaufhold, "Systemaufsicht. Der Europäische Ausschuss für Systemrisiken im Finanzsystem als Ausprägung einer neuen Aufsichtsform", *Die Verwaltung* (2012) 21-57.

⁶⁸ L. Dalla Pellegrina, D. Masciandaro and R. V. Pansini, "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?", 9 *Journal of Financial Stability* (2013) 415-427, 415-6: "great reversal".

⁶⁹ ECB, "The ECB's monetary policy strategy", press release, 8 May 2003, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2003/html/pr030508_2.en.html.

⁷⁰ "The ECB's monetary policy strategy after the evaluation and clarification of May 2003", Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, delivered at the Center for Financial Studies' key event, Frankfurt am Main, 20 November 2003, available at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2003/html/sp031120.en.html>.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² ECB, *The Monetary Policy of the ECB* (2011) 83-86.

C. Law: Legality of a Holistic Approach to Monetary Policy and Supervision

The preferability of a holistic approach is a question which I readily defer to the economics profession. The salient legal issues are whether a holistic approach to monetary policy is in conformity with the current legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (I.), and whether monetary considerations are legitimate within the framework for prudential supervision, should the SSM wish to opt for a holistic approach in that respect as well (II.). In my view, both questions are to be answered in the affirmative. Both the mandate for monetary policy and the supervisory powers of the ECB are drafted in a relatively abstract, open manner, leaving the European Central Bank sufficient scope for holistic approaches. The ECB can take due account of its monetary policy within the scope of its supervisory functions (or to take due account of supervisory concerns within the frame of its monetary policy) as long as such influence remains proportionate to the supervisory (or monetary) policy objective.

It thus turns out that the legal framework of the EMU is rather neutral if it comes to the choice between strict functional separation and more holistic approaches. It does not subscribe to a particular school of economic thought in that respect.

I. Financial Stability as a Concern for Monetary Policy

The conformity of a holistic approach to monetary policy, such as the one adopted by the ECB in the frame of its two-pillar strategy, has never been called in question prior to the establishment of the SSM. This is not particularly surprising as the ECB was not a supervisory authority at the time. In addition, the debate surrounding the establishment of the SSM has sharpened attention for this issue, as it suggested *prima facie* that the ECB should follow a strict separation model.

Upon closer scrutiny, this impression turns out to be wrong. Financial stability, understood as the “a condition where the financial system is able to withstand shocks without giving way to cumulative processes which impair the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the processing of payments in the economy”,⁷³ is a legitimate consideration for the ECB in the formulation of its monetary policy. According to Art. 127(1) TFEU, the ECB’s primary objective in the pursuit of monetary policy is price stability. This notion is open to interpretation.⁷⁴ It lends itself to a broad reading, which allows monetary policy to take prudential considerations into account as long as other treaty provisions are respected. This results from the fact that that the attainment of price stability presupposes some degree of financial stability. In other words,

⁷³ T. Padoa-Schioppa, "Central banks and financial stability: exploring the land in between", in V. Gaspar et al. (ed.), *The Transformation of the European Financial System* (2003) 269-310 269, 287. Similar: Issing (n 36) 16.

⁷⁴ ECJ, Case C-370/12 *Pringle vs Ireland et al.*, EU:C:2012:756, para. 53.

one needs to understand the concept of price stability in a more holistic sense. The argument proceeds from textual via historic and systematic to purposive reasons.

The text of the treaties does not necessarily impose the possibility of a holistic reading. Art. 127 (1) TFEU does not even mention financial stability.⁷⁵ Only Art. 127 (5) TFEU stipulates that “[t]he ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system”. The mere wording of this provision does not reveal whether it creates only an accessory competence for the ECB outside of its monetary policy mandate, or whether it implies that stability considerations may influence monetary policy decisions taken in accordance with Art. 127 (1) TFEU.

The drafting history reveals that the powers of the ECB with regard to financial stability were first included in the draft of Art. 3.1 of the ESCB Statute – which reproduces the basic tasks of the ECB in accordance with Art. 127 (2) TFEU – but then relegated to Art. 3.3 of the ESCB Statute.⁷⁶ This might imply that the powers relating to financial stability and prudential supervision are unrelated to the monetary policy mandate. At first sight, this position appears to find confirmation in the systematic structure of the ESCB Statute. Art. 25.1 of the ESCB Statute, the only provision of the chapter on prudential supervision, assigns only an advisory function to the ECB in supervisory matters.⁷⁷ However, Art. 25.1 ESCB Statute is the provision of the Statute that corresponds to the advisory Art. 127 (5) TFEU. One may therefore argue that it is enumerative only for the competences of the ECB exercised on that legal basis and is irrelevant for the monetary policy mandate and the question whether financial stability is a legitimate concern for the latter.⁷⁸

Further, given that some National Central Banks follow an integration model,⁷⁹ one might argue that it would not contradict the systematic structure of the legal framework of the EMU if the ECB takes stability issues into consideration in its monetary policy. Thus, a look at the text, history and systematic structure of the EMU legal framework reveals that there are no compelling reasons that would *exclude* a holistic approach. But that alone does not *positively* empower the ECB to exercise its monetary policy mandate in a holistic fashion.

⁷⁵ Concluding that financial stability concerns therefore have no place in monetary policy: H. Siekmann, "Missachtung rechtlicher Vorgaben des AEUV durch die Mitgliedstaaten und die EZB in der Schuldenkrise", in T. M. J. Möllers and F.-C. Zeitler (ed.), *Europa als Rechtsgemeinschaft-Währungsunion und Schuldenkrise* (2013) 101-101, 145.

⁷⁶ R. M. Lastra and J. V. Louis, "European Economic and Monetary Union: History, Trends, and Prospects", 32 *Yearbook of European Law* (2013) 57-206, 82.

⁷⁷ Art. 25.1, ESCB Statute. Art. 25.2 ESCB Statute refers to Art. 127 (6) TFEU and has no relevance for the question under consideration.

⁷⁸ Disagreeing: C. Waldhoff, "Art. 127", in H. Siekmann (ed.), *Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion 2* (2013) 263-322 marginal no. 69.

⁷⁹ R. Smits, *The European Central Bank. Institutional Aspects* (1997) (n 6) 338-9.

The latter depends on a purposive reading of the relevant provisions in the ECB legal framework. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) clarified in *Gauweiler* that the stabilization of the Euro area as such is not a goal of monetary policy, but an economic policy objective.⁸⁰ Instead, the objective of monetary policy is price stability. Nevertheless, the court recognized the interplay between monetary policy and financial stability⁸¹ and confirmed that measures of the ECB aimed at ensuring the effective transmission of monetary policy are covered by its monetary policy mandate.⁸² Art. 127 (5) TFEU corroborates that view in that it explicitly recognizes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the text of the TFEU.⁸³ It therefore seems plausible to argue that the ECB, in the discharge of its monetary policy mandate under Art. 127(1) and (2) TFEU, may legitimately take into account financial stability considerations as long as the overall objective of such policy is price stability, i.e. as long as it enhances financial stability to further price stability, and not as an end in itself. In that sense, financial stability would be an intermediate, second-order goal of monetary policy. This consideration is independent of the empirical question whether a holistic approach would produce better *aggregate* results.⁸⁴ It only needs to be beneficial for price stability.

In conclusion, a purposive reading of the ECB's monetary policy mandate reveals that it is open for a holistic approach. Financial stability considerations may therefore play a role in the exercise of the ECB's monetary policy mandate. Along the lines of the *Gauweiler* case, the pursuit of financial stability concerns under the monetary policy mandate finds its limit in the proportionality principle.⁸⁵ Any tradeoff between price stability and financial stability in monetary policy decisions therefore needs to have the objective of fostering price stability, and to be appropriate, necessary, and proportionate to that objective. Where that line lies exactly is primarily entrusted to the discretion of the ECB. However, the ECB has to provide reasons, which are subject to judicial scrutiny.⁸⁶ The independence of the ECB does not stand in the way of a holistic approach, as the ECB's monetary policy pillar is exposed to the factual effects of other actors' decisions all the time anyway, whether they are political, legal, or administrative.

One might add that the ECB is not under a legal duty to adopt a holistic approach. While it was argued prior to the introduction of the SSM that the principle of loyal cooperation pursuant to Art. 4(3) TEU obliges domestic supervisors to support the ECB's monetary policy in the exercise of their supervisory powers,⁸⁷ this provision does not apply to the SSM as a part of a European institution. The analogous provision in

⁸⁰ ECJ *Pringle*, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756, para. 56; ECJ *Gauweiler*, C-62/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 64.

⁸¹ ECJ *Gauweiler* (n 53) paras 51 and 52.

⁸² ECJ *Gauweiler* (n 53) paras 49-50.

⁸³ Cf. C. Ohler, *Bankenaufsicht und Geldpolitik in der Währungsunion* (2015) (n 6) 74, who, however, locates the competence of the ECB for financial stability considerations only in Art. 127 (5) TFEU.

⁸⁴ Cf. *supra* (n 63).

⁸⁵ Art. 5 (4) TEU; ECJ *Gauweiler* (n 53) paras. 66 et seq.

⁸⁶ See Art. 296 (2) TFEU; ECJ *Gauweiler* (n 53) para. 70.

⁸⁷ Glatzl (n 15) 244.

Art. 13(2) TEU, which imposes a duty of mutual sincere cooperation on the institutions of the Union, does not affect legal relationships within one institution. The internal law of the institution defines the latter by establishing a hierarchical order.

II. Price Stability as a Concern for Prudential Supervision

According to common wisdom, the SSM Regulation provides for the strict separation of the ECB's monetary and supervisory pillars. While much emphasis was put on this aspect of the SSM in public communications during the drafting process, the exact significance of that separation remains somewhat unclear. I argue that this provision does not stand in the way of a holistic approach to prudential supervision which would give due consideration to monetary policy concerns. Its significance is mostly institutional. I base this argument on textual, systematic, and purposive reasons.

As concerns the wording of the SSM Regulation, it hardly reflects the public noise surrounding the separation issue during the drafting process. According to Recital 12, the SSM needs to ensure that “credit institutions are subject to supervision of the highest quality, unfettered by other, non-prudential considerations”. The use of the word “unfettered” would indeed be difficult to reconcile with a holistic approach. However, the wording of article 25(2) of the SSM Regulation sets another tone. Accordingly, “[t]he ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and any other tasks. The tasks conferred on the ECB by this Regulation shall neither interfere with, nor be determined by, its tasks relating to monetary policy.” The crucial terms of that provision do not appear to be as categorical and absolute as “unfettered”. Thus, the terms “without prejudice to” and “[not] interfere with” seem to rule out any negative influence of supervisory decisions on monetary policy, but not necessarily beneficial ones. In that respect, it seems apposite to recall the logic of the holistic approach, which consists in exchanging short-term disadvantages against long-term mutual benefits. Making both financial supervision and monetary policy more effective in the long run can hardly be considered as prejudice or interference. The term “separate from” seems to refer to the organizational structure of the SSM within the ECB alone. Finally, for financial supervision to be “determined by” monetary policy would require monetary policy to have a dominant influence over supervision. This is not the intention behind a more holistic approach.

The result of the textual analysis is confirmed by the context of the other provisions of the SSM Regulation. This puts the multiple institutional links that connect the monetary policy and supervisory pillars of the ECB into perspective. The SSM Regulation does not establish a completely separate organization, as the theory

of functional separation would have it. Despite the safeguards undertaken to separate supervisory from monetary policy decisions, such as the separation of the staff,⁸⁸ the duty to convene separate meetings of the Governing Council for each pillar, and the prohibition for the Governing Council to modify draft supervisory decisions,⁸⁹ etc., considerable linkages remain.⁹⁰ Notably, decisions concerning both pillars eventually come together in the Governing Council.⁹¹ Further, the Chair of the Supervisory Board is appointed by the Council on the proposal of the ECB.⁹² The most direct overlap concerns the position of the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board. She is an ex-officio member of the Governing Council and consequently participates in monetary policy decisions.⁹³ A comparable overlap exists in respect of the role of the President of the ECB as Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board. The provisions of Art. 25(2) SSM Regulation have to be read in light of these links. It seems difficult to deny that the latter would not relativize the former.

The purposes of monetary policy and prudential supervision, respectively, corroborate this view. Given the mentioned interplay between monetary policy and financial supervision, and taking into account the fact that financial stability also depends on smooth monetary transmission and thus the ability of the central bank to provide liquidity, at least three additional reasons support a holistic approach.

First, in democracies, decision-makers have to assume responsibility for their acts. Adopting the proposals of the Supervisory Board means that the Governing Council endorses them and accepts responsibility. But how can it accept responsibility for decisions that potentially cancel out each other?⁹⁴ It is difficult to imagine how the Governing Council or the Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board would justify decisions that defeat each other to some extent. Apart from the paradoxical situation which this creates for the respective office holders, it would render democratic control of such decisions rather difficult. How should one criticize officeholders that adopt contradictory decisions except for the fact that they are contradictory? Adopting them at separate meetings might make the contradiction less visible, but does not eliminate it. Only a holistic approach would have that effect.

⁸⁸ Recitals 65 and 66, SSM Regulation.

⁸⁹ Art. 25(4), SSM Regulation.

⁹⁰ In this sense also J. A. Kämmerer, "Bahn frei der Bankenunion? Die neuen Aufsichtsbefugnisse der EZB im Lichte der EU-Kompetenzordnung", *Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht* (2013) 830-836 (n 6) 832; Moloney (n 2) 1635; E. Ferran and V. S. Babis, "The European single supervisory mechanism", 13 *Journal of Corporate Law Studies* (2013) 255-285, 266.

⁹¹ Art. 26(8), SSM Regulation.

⁹² Art. 26(3), SSM Regulation.

⁹³ Art. 26(3) SSM Regulation.

⁹⁴ C. Manger-Nestler, "Die Bankenunion. Einheitliche Mechanismen zur Bankenaufsicht und -abwicklung", in H.-J. Blanke and S. Pilz (ed.), *Die "Fiskalunion"* (2014) 299-345 299, 325-6. See also O. Sacarcelik, "Europäische Bankenunion: Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen und Herausforderungen der einheitlichen europäischen Bankenaufsicht", *Zeitschrift für Bank und Kapitalmarktrecht (BKR)* (2013) 353, 355.

Second, if the Governing Council wants to avoid said contradictions, it seems likely to reject supervisory decisions which it believes would get into the way of monetary policy.⁹⁵ This would avoid the self-contradiction. But it would also give precedence to monetary policy over financial stability. This would be problematic on many levels. Economically, there is no reason to assume that suboptimal monetary policy would have more serious consequences than suboptimal prudential supervision. Politically, it would be biased against taxpayers who might ultimately have to bear the costs of bank recapitalizations. And constitutionally, there is no reason to favor monetary policy over other economic policies. While Article 127 (1) TFEU does indeed prioritize price stability over other policy goals, that provision only applies to monetary policy and exchange rate policy, as Art. 119 (2) TFEU reveals with great clarity.⁹⁶ The separation envisaged by the SSM Regulation would end up in an asymmetry between monetary policy and supervision that seems difficult to justify. This might give rise to systemic risk – which the SSM is supposed to better protect against.

Third, contradictory decisions would involve risks to the ECB's reputation and hence to monetary stability. Central banks depend on the trust of market participants. One possible way of earning such trust is by acting consistently. Contradictory or self-defeating measures emanating from the two pillars of the ECB would only undermine its reputation, and thereby its capacity for the effective conduct of monetary policy. The holistic approach seeks to avoid that risk.

In conclusion, contrary to the impression one might gain from the public debate, the SSM Regulation would hardly prevent a more holistic approach to financial supervision, should the ECB opt for it. The ECB, and especially the Supervisory Board, may give due consideration to monetary policy considerations in the discharge of their supervisory function, as long as this influence does not become dominant and, of course, respects the principle of proportionality.⁹⁷ The substantive rules relating to financial regulation provide many entry points for monetary policy considerations in supervisory decisions. One possible entry point is the liquidity coverage requirement⁹⁸ as well as other provisions on liquidity risk.⁹⁹ But what matters crucially for monetary policy transmission is the availability of credit to the real economy. Hence, the entire

⁹⁵ Cf. Art. 26 (8), SSM Regulation.

⁹⁶ H. Siekmann, "Art. 119", in H. Siekmann (ed.), *Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion* (2013) marginal no. 102; C. Waldhoff, "Art. 127", in H. Siekmann (ed.), *Kommentar zur Europäischen Währungsunion 2* (2013) 263-322 (n 78) marginal no. 7; H. J. Hahn and U. Häde, *Währungsrecht* (2nd edn., 2010) Sec. 15 marginal no. 14. Dissenting, arguing that the treaties give precedence to price stability: Manger-Nestler (n 94) 326.

⁹⁷ See *supra* n 85 and accompanying text.

⁹⁸ Art. 411 et seq., Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176/1 of 27 June 2013 ("CRR").

⁹⁹ E.g. Art. 86, CRD IV.

regulatory framework for capital requirements and risk management might contribute to the smooth transmission of monetary policy.

III. Towards a Legal Instability Theorem for Finance?

The foregoing analysis of the SSM Regulation holds an important lesson concerning the capacity of the law to steer behavior, and in particular to regulate issues of economic policy. That capacity is much more limited than many seem to suggest. After the no-bailout clause¹⁰⁰ and the concept of price stability,¹⁰¹ Art. 25 (2) SSM Regulation provides yet another example of a legal rule that seemingly erects an insurmountable, rock-solid legal barrier – which then turns out to be much softer and malleable than expected faced with changing circumstances or increasing external pressure. In analogy to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis,¹⁰² one might be tempted to propose a legal instability theorem for finance. This article might not be the right place to develop a fully-fledged legal theory. Suffice it therefore to outline with a broad brush some salient features such a theory may potentially have.

My starting point is Katharina Pistor’s legal theory of finance.¹⁰³ Accordingly, the uncertainty of market developments and liquidity constraints make financial markets inherently instable. Law contributes to that instability as debts are nothing but enforceable legal obligations. In case of a crisis, many creditors try to enforce their claims at the same time, which would bring the system to a collapse. To avoid that consequence, obligations at the apex of the hierarchy of finance might not be honored to ensure the system’s survival, while borrowers in the lower echelons of the financial hierarchy without systemic significance will have to pay.

All of the factors of instability observed by Pistor are exogenous to the law, including the simultaneous enforcement of contractual obligations, as this presupposes an external shock.¹⁰⁴ This is not surprising for a theory that is predominantly inductive and meant to explain empirically measurable causal relations. The legal instability theorem differs from Pistor’s account in three respects. First, it focuses on the instability of the law itself rather than on that of financial markets; second, it considers a good deal of the sources of such instability to be endogenous to the law, similar to Minsky’s hypothesis, according to which financial instability results from the ordinary operation of financial markets and not necessarily from external shocks;

¹⁰⁰ Art. 125 (1), TFEU.

¹⁰¹ Art. 127 (1), TFEU.

¹⁰² Minsky (n 60).

¹⁰³ K. Pistor, "A legal theory of finance", 41 *Journal of Comparative Economics* (2013) 315-330.

¹⁰⁴ Id. 316.

and third, it considers issues of democratic legitimacy as a main driver of change, not merely power as defined by the financial hierarchy.¹⁰⁵

I think that one can understand law's instability to a considerable extent as endogenous. This assumption derives from the hermeneutic nature of the law. Law is neither a piece of wood or iron, nor a computer program. It is a communicative practice whose existence is ultimately confined to the human mind – despite its undeniable social effects. Whether something is illegal or legal depends on processes of understanding which are based on language. The meaning of legal rules, like of language in general, derives from its usage in a certain context.¹⁰⁶ The meaning of legal rules therefore varies with our perceptions of their context and the construction of that context by those understanding and applying the law.¹⁰⁷ This makes law adaptable, especially to unpredictable and instable contexts such as financial crises. However, this comes at the cost of law's predictability. Reliance on the law to produce a certain effect in the future is therefore nearly impossible as long as one does not know that future.¹⁰⁸

But how about numerical rules? Instead of a vague term like price stability, one might as well adopt a legal provision that stipulates a target of close to 2%. At this point, another feature of the hermeneutic nature of the law comes into play: one rule never comes alone; each rule is part of a context of rules that lend themselves to systematic interpretation. Interpreting a rule consists to a good deal in imagining and constructing the relations between that rule and other rules. This construction is situative, and it is therefore impossible to predict which rule will prevail. Thus, in theory, even a numerical rule might have to give precedence to another legal principle.

What, then, explains change in the law? Is it entirely dependent on subjective preferences, idiosyncratic constructions of the context of a certain rule within the legal order in a given situation? Or is change in the law simply a question of power – be it economic, political, institutional, social, moral, or cultural? While many of these factors might play a role, one should not overlook issues of democratic legitimacy – of the rules to be applied, the actors applying them, the entities affected by that application, and above all of the discourse surrounding their application.¹⁰⁹ Law – whether we are talking about legislation or adjudication¹¹⁰ – ultimately needs to be acceptable, and in our present constellation, that usually requires democratic

¹⁰⁵ Cf., however, id. 323: Pistor hints at the significance of democracy for financial stability several times, but never really engages with this issue.

¹⁰⁶ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* 1 (16th edn., 2004) Sec. 43.

¹⁰⁷ H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960) 333-335.

¹⁰⁸ With respect to Dworkin's right answer thesis: J. Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung* (1992) 278-9.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. J. Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung* (1992) 272 et seq.

¹¹⁰ On the democratic ramifications of judgments by (international) courts, see A. v. Bogdandy and I. Venzke, "In Whose Name? An Investigation of International Courts' Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification", 23 *European Journal of International Law* (2012) 7-41.

legitimacy. What sets democratic legitimacy apart from other factors inducing change in the law like economic, social, or other forms of power, is that its influence can be normatively justified. In that sense, the method of purposive interpretation allows legal rules to change in parallel with processes of democratic deliberation. If the democratic consensus regarding a certain legal rule evolves as a consequence of these processes, courts might become less inclined to resist. At least, this appears to be a likely result in economic policy matters with distributive relevance, provided that no fundamental human rights are seriously affected.

As emphasized above, this is still a very general, somewhat speculative theory for explaining legal instability in relation to macroeconomic regulation. Nevertheless, it might explain why the hope to erect a solid legal wall separating the SSM from monetary policy decisions might have been forlorn from the outset. The dichotomy between rules and discretion, a common reference point in economic theory, thus appears to be misleading, as rules are a lot more discretionary than the dichotomy suggests.¹¹¹

D. Constitutional Theory: The Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB

I. The End of Technocratic Legitimacy

The realization that the SSM and monetary policy might follow a holistic approach raises the question whether the ECB enjoys sufficient democratic legitimacy for that purpose. According to Article 10 (1) TEU, the Union and its member states are based on the principle of representative democracy. Article 130 TFEU, which ensures the independence of the ECB, constitutes an exception to this rule.¹¹² It is justified by the functional necessity to protect monetary policy from time inconsistencies.¹¹³ However, this exception is based on the explicit assumption that monetary policy follows defined rules, and that its faithfulness to these rules is subject to political control and judicial review.¹¹⁴ These assumptions are incompatible with the legal instability theorem. Accordingly, the functions of the ECB are much more vaguely defined and it is uncertain how they will develop in the future.¹¹⁵ The technocratic, expertise-based legitimacy of the ECB,

¹¹¹ Cf. F. E. Kydland and E. C. Prescott, "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", 85 *The Journal of Political Economy* (1977) 473-492.

¹¹² BVerfG *Gauweiler*, decision of 14 January 2014, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:rs20140114.2bvr272813, para. 59; with respect to Art. 88 of the Basic Law: BVerfG *Maastricht*, judgment of 12 October 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155, 208-9; F. Amtenbrink and R. M. Lastra, "Securing Democratic Accountability of Financial Regulatory Agencies - A Theoretical Framework", in R. V. De Mulder (ed.), *Mitigating Risk in the Context of Safety and Security - How Relevant is a Rational Approach?* (2008) 115-132 115; S. Dinov, "Europäische Bankenaufsicht im Wandel", *Zeitschrift Europarecht (EuR)* (2013) 593, 606.

¹¹³ See *supra* (n 33) and accompanying text.

¹¹⁴ E.g. O. Issing, "The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or 'Willem in Euroland'", 37 *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (1999) 503-519.

¹¹⁵ See also J. De Haan and S. C. W. Eijffinger, "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales", 38 *Journal of Common Market Studies* (2000) 393-407, 397-8.

on which the ECB has tried to capitalize by a strategy of “hyper-scientization” in the form of a myriad of conferences and papers produced by its directorate for research,¹¹⁶ therefore convinces less and less¹¹⁷ – especially now after the highly controversial decisions concerning access to normal lending windows and Emergency Liquidity Assistance for Greek banks during the Greek debt crisis in 2015.¹¹⁸

The allocation of supervisory powers to the ECB increases its democratic deficit as financial supervision has enormous distributional consequences.¹¹⁹ A further aggravating factor is the independence enjoyed by the ECB for its supervisory functions, as necessary as it may have been to protect the ECB’s independence in respect of monetary policy.¹²⁰ And the adoption of a holistic approach to monetary policy and financial supervision would intensify the problem. While the holistic approach does not render the powers of the ECB entirely discretionary, it allows the ECB to make certain tradeoffs between price stability and financial stability within the limits of the proportionality principle. As necessary as one might deem a holistic approach for the effective fulfilment of the ECB’s two principal functions, it increases the ECB’s discretionary powers – those for which democratic legitimacy is most needed. This calls for a rethinking of the democratic legitimacy of the ECB.

II. Undoing Central Bank Independence?

In light of these difficulties, some take a radical step and call into question the value of the ECB’s independence. On the one hand, this view is held by considerate observers of economic policy, who recall that independence is only justified as long as the central bank follows only one clearly defined policy goal.¹²¹ Accordingly, reassigning monetary policy to the treasury would amount to a return to the early postwar period – a period that many consider as one of exceptional growth and equality. On the other hand, there are some who simply disagree with the ECB’s policy rate at the zero lower bound and see it as a threat to price stability and – most importantly, their own personal wealth. This view seems to be held predominantly

¹¹⁶ S. L. Mudge and A. Vauchez, "Fielding supranationalism: the European Central Bank as a field effect", 64 *The Sociological Review Monographs* (2016) 146-169.

¹¹⁷ For an early critique see L. W. Gormley and J. De Haan, "The democratic deficit of the European Central Bank", 21 *European Law Review* (1996) 95-112.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Case T-368/15, Order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 14 July 2016, *Alcimos Consulting SMPC v European Central Bank*, ECLI:EU:T:2016:438; for a detailed account, see DIEM25, "#TheGreekFiles. Why independence is impossible without greater transparency", (2017) (2017).

¹¹⁹ Cf. R. Franck and M. Krausz, "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?", 36 *Journal of Comparative Economics* (2008) 388-411 (n 34).

¹²⁰ Art. 19, SSM Regulation.

¹²¹ Wolfgang Münchau, 'Central bank independence is losing its lustre' *Financial Times*, 19 February 2017, <<https://www.ft.com/content/6ed32b02-f526-11e6-95ee-f14e55513608>>. This position refers to Issing (n 114).

by persons at the very right end of the political spectrum.¹²² However, to the author's knowledge, proponents of these views have not produced new solutions for the time inconsistency problem that would make an independent central bank superfluous. As concerns the last mentioned view, the goal of its proponents may well be not to replace ECB independence with something else, but to replace the ECB with supposedly independent national central banks.

III. Democratizing an Independent ECB

Besides the lack of viable alternatives for solving the time inconsistency problem, calls to strip the ECB of its independence miss the significance of independent institutions for European integration. According to Antoine Vauchez, European integration has mostly been advanced by the independent, expertise-driven institutions of the Union –the Commission, the CJEU, and the ECB. He argues that the independent institutions are at the center of the Union's legitimacy – and not the Parliament, whose elections face a smaller and smaller voter turnout despite the nomination of *Spitzenkandidaten*. By contrast, the independent institutions set a healthy counterweight to ordinary intergovernmental settings. This provides them with a form of legitimacy that is not apolitical and purely technocratic, yet does not rely on traditional parliamentary representation.¹²³ Instead, democratic control over these institutions first was in the hands of member states governments, and is now mostly exercised by domestic courts.¹²⁴

Faced with current anti-European sentiment, which has brought the independent institutions under pressure,¹²⁵ Antoine Vauchez has spearheaded calls for strengthening their democratic accountability.¹²⁶ In particular, it seems necessary to develop mechanisms of control and accountability at the European level to escape the trap of nationalism. In this respect, various options exist for strengthening democratic control over the ECB.

First, the ECB could increase its output legitimacy by stepping up its transparency. It has already made considerable progress in that respect.¹²⁷ The Governing Council is now publishing the results of its monetary

¹²² Katie Allen, 'Mario Draghi defends ECB independence after German criticism', *The Guardian*, 21 April 2016, <<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/21/mario-draghi-defends-ecb-independence-german-criticism-central-bank-eurozone-interest-rates>>; Alice Weidel, 'Der EZB Einhalt gebieten', 22 March 2016, <<https://www.afdbayern.de/alice-weidel-der-etz-einhalt-gebieten/>>.

¹²³ A. Vauchez, *Démocratiser l'Europe* (2014), especially at 45-6; A. Vauchez, "The Appeal of Independence: Exploring Europe's Way of Political Legitimacy", *TARN Working Paper 7/2016 (2016)* (2016).

¹²⁴ Vauchez, *Démocratiser l'Europe* (n 123) 51-3, 57-8.

¹²⁵ *Id.*, 59 et seq., 77-9.

¹²⁶ *Id.* 80-1.

¹²⁷ On the ECB's transparency policy, see ECB (n 72) 86 et seq.

policy meetings.¹²⁸ But the availability of individual bank data might help the public to review the performance of the ECB as a supervisor and to strengthen the ECB's reputation¹²⁹ – especially in controversial cases such as Monte dei Paschi.¹³⁰ Further, in cases where the legality of ECB acts is in question, the ECB may simply publish its assessments of the legal situation, just as any administrative authority provides a reasoned opinion on its views.¹³¹

But transparency alone does not enable effective control – the ECB needs to be responsive to public debate. This usually requires some kind of institutionalized mechanism for holding the ECB to account.¹³² In that respect, the parliamentary scrutiny of the ECB is moving in the right direction.¹³³ The ECB's accountability towards the European Parliament extends over both its monetary policy and its supervisory activities.¹³⁴ National parliaments, by contrast, can only hold the Supervisory Board accountable¹³⁵ or their own national central bank,¹³⁶ but not the ECB, despite its involvement in the so-called troika.¹³⁷ These differences in accountability are difficult to justify in view of the close links between monetary policy and supervision,¹³⁸ especially under a holistic approach.

Ultimately, the question arises whether the ECB's technocratic legitimacy can be enhanced by greater representativeness, yet without stripping it off its identity as an expertise-driven institution.¹³⁹ At the moment, the ECB is extremely far removed from electoral accountability. The Governing Council is

¹²⁸ Cf. 'ECB to adjust schedule of meetings and to publish regular accounts of monetary policy discussions in 2015', ECB Press conference of 3 July 2014, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140703_1.en.html>.

¹²⁹ C. Gandrud and M. Hallerberg, "Does Banking Union Worsen the EU's Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency", 53 *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* (2015) 769-785.

¹³⁰ See only Alex Barker, Claire Jones and Rachel Sanderson, 'Brussels and ECB split on Monte dei Paschi's capital proposals', *Financial Times*, 23 February 2017, <<https://www.ft.com/content/9635b04c-f923-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71>>.

¹³¹ Cf. Diem25 (n 118).

¹³² Instructive: R. W. Grant and R. O. Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics", 99 *American Political Science Review* (2005) 29-43, 36.

¹³³ Moloney (n 2) 1611; cf. also Recital 48, SSM Regulation.

¹³⁴ Cf. Art. 284 (3) TFEU; Art. 20, SSM Regulation, in conjunction with the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and the European central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

¹³⁵ G. L. Schiavo, "From National Banking Supervision to a Centralized Model of Prudential Supervision in Europe? The Stability Function of the Single Supervisory Mechanism", 21 *Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (MJ)* (2014) 110-141, 125.

¹³⁶ D. Curtin, "Democratic accountability of EU executive power. A reform agenda for parliaments", in F. Fabbrini (ed.), *What form of government for the European Union and the Eurozone?* (2015) 171-194 171, 185.

¹³⁷ T. Beukers, "Constitutional changes in Euro government and the relationship between the ECB and the executive power in the Union", in F. Fabbrini (ed.), *What form of government for the European Union and the Eurozone?* (2015) 95-110 95, 109 (on Draghi defying accountability before national parliaments).

¹³⁸ *Id.*, 109.

¹³⁹ Vauchez, *Democratiser l'Europe* (n 123) 83. Along similar lines with respect to the Federal Reserve: J. Stiglitz, "Central Banking in a Democratic Society", 146 *De Economist* (1998) 199-226, 217 et seq.

composed of the heads of the National Central Banks of the Eurozone, appointed in accordance with the law of their member states, and the Executive Board, appointed by the European Council on a recommendation of the Council and after consultation with the European Parliament and the Governing Council (Art. 283 TFEU). Voting rights among the heads of of the National Central Banks rotate in accordance with Art. 10.2 of the ESCB Statute. These factors make it nearly impossible to derive the legitimacy of the decisions of the most important body of the ECB from the will of the people in any meaningful way. It rather appears as the more or less random result of a whole series of appointments – and related backroom deals – at the European level to some extent, yet mostly still at the domestic level. This hardly provides the Governing Council with sufficient legitimacy given the policy implications and high level of discretion involved in the discharge of its functions.¹⁴⁰ It would help a lot to make the governing council more representative in one way or another which would strengthen – and not compromise – its independence. For example, one might give the European Parliament the right to appoint the members of the Executive Board in a single, comprehensive vote. Likewise, a rotating system for the heads of National Central Banks seems worthy of a technical body, but not of a politicized institution. One possibility would be to have the Council, the European institution representing the member states, elect representatives of National Central Banks. That would introduce into the ESCB the dual legitimacy characteristic of the EU in general.¹⁴¹

E. Towards a Deliberative Paradigm of the Law

The hopes cherished in respect of the separation model may have been disappointed. Legal barriers are all but rock-solid, as the legal instability theorem explains. Still, such barriers find their way into current legislation again and again, as the example of the separation between monetary and supervisory functions in the SSM Regulation shows. However, there is no point in trying to nail pudding to the wall. Hence, it might enhance the governance of the EMU if those making and applying financial regulation took the unfeasibility of these barriers more seriously.

This would imply moving from a substantive paradigm of law to a deliberative one.¹⁴² By that I mean an understanding the law primarily as a guideline for decision-making processes, one that structures future decisions in a procedural and argumentative sense and determines their overall direction, yet without determining future legal decisions with precision. Such a paradigm appears to be commensurate to

¹⁴⁰ Vauchez (n 139) 90 et seq.

¹⁴¹ J. Habermas, "The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International Law", 23 *European Journal of International Law* (2012) 335-348, 344.

¹⁴² Habermas (n 108) ch. 9.

contemporary democratic capitalism and its unpredictable and crisis-prone existence. Under the deliberative paradigm, law legitimizes public authority not by casting in stone decisions taken at a certain point irrespective of future developments, but by ensuring that democratically adopted decisions adapt to changing circumstances and by establishing feedback channels between the demos and the decision-makers for that purpose.

Thus, the deliberative paradigm advocates a more flexible idea of the law. Paradoxically, though, this might be conducive to greater economic and political stability. It allows finding situatively adequate and acceptable solutions between diverging policy goals. In that sense, diversity might ultimately foster unity.

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